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Abstract
This article provides simulation results of Pareto-improving transitions from pay-as-
you-go to fully funded pension systems in an economy where agents are heterogeneous
within generations. The possibility of such transitions for a wide range of parameters
states that intergenerational heterogeneity should no longer be considered an obstacle
when implementing Pareto-improving pension reforms. To maintain redistributive or
insurance mechanisms supported by pay-as-you-go systems, I propose to replace social
system with redistributive tax and transfer payments inside one generation. This
would save the economy from the ineﬃciency related to the implicit taxes on pension
contributions imposed by pay-as-you-go systems.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The privatisation of social security is one of the most important economic issues today. In
the last thirty years, many countries have faced drastic demographic changes leading to a
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1dramatic increase in dependency ratio and a reduction in payroll growth. Economists and
policy makers world wide predict that this tendency will continue for at least 50 years1,
which will make pay-as-you-go systems even more ineﬃcient. For a more detail discussion,
see various World Bank publications, for example, World Bank (1994) and, more recently, Fox
and Palmer (2001). A continuation of the current systems will force governments to either
increase taxes or reduce the beneﬁts for future generations, which would cause a decrease
in welfare levels, as compared to those guaranteed by the present pension schemes. Thus,
Feldstein and Samwick (2000) predict that the U.S. ”current pure pay-as-you-go system can
only maintain the beneﬁts speciﬁed in current law by raising the payroll tax rate from 12.4
percent today to more than 17 percent by 2037 and nearly 19 percent by the end of the
actuaries’ 75 year forecast period.”
Pay-as-you-go systems are ineﬃcient even in the present demographic environment, since
the rates of capital return exceeds the growth of wage bills2. This conclusion was ﬁrst
drawn by Samuelson (1975). The ineﬃciency arises from the indirect taxation on pension
contributions imposed by pay-as-you-go systems. In additional, it is fueled by the distortions
to the labor market due to social security payroll taxes. According to Feldstein (1996), the
relevant deadweight loss equals approximately one percent of GDP in the U.S. In closed
economies, the damage from pay-as-you-go systems is even larger due to the reduction in
savings. An increase in capital accumulation, caused by the pension reform will also increase
pre-tax wages. The transition to a fully funded system might also cause larger economic
growth in the presence of endogenous technical progress, as discussed in Wiedmer (1996).
The question considered in this paper is the one of how to introduce a better pension sys-
tem without anybody suﬀering. On the one hand, the old generations must be compensated
for their contributions to a pay-as-you-go system, and therefore, the young generations have
to pay twice: taxed for pensions for the old, they also have to contribute to their own pension
accumulation fund. On the other hand, a reduction in payroll taxes leads to higher wages
1For demographic projections see, for example, the World Bank data base ”World Development
Indicators”.
2According to Feldstein and Samwick (2000), the real rate of return will exceed the growth of the average
real wage by at least 4.5% annually.
2and larger capital supply, thereby providing some ﬁnancing for a transition. This paper in-
vestigates whether and when those funds are suﬃcient for a Pareto-improving reform, with
the purpose of convincing the readers that a Pareto-eﬃcient transition can nearly always be
implemented.
I start my paper by providing a systematic classiﬁcation of earlier studies related to the
possibility of a Pareto-improving pension reform in a representative agent economy (section
2). The existence of Pareto-improving transition depends on whether economy is open or
close, how elastic labor supply is, the relationship between beneﬁts and contributions and
the policy instruments used during transition. The last section
Then, in section 3, I reject the intragenerational heterogeneity as an argument against the
possibility of a Pareto-improving transition. In particular, I provide simulations of Pareto-
improving transitions for economies with two types of agents, distinguished by productivity
levels and preference parameterization. To maintain the pre-reform welfare level of less
productive (or less lucky) households, I propose to make the redistribution within one gener-
ation. This mechanism endures the redistributive and insurance functions of a pay-as-you-go
system, but saves the economy from the ineﬃciency related to the implicit taxes on pension
contributions. As a result I disargued Brunner (1994, 1996) and Fenge and Schwager (1995)
and show that intergenerational heterogeneitys h o u l dn ol o n g e rb ec o n s i d e r e da no b s t a c l et o
implementing Pareto-improving pension reforms.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 A review of the literature on the existence of a Pareto-
eﬃcient transition in a representative agent’s econ-
omy.
Studying previous literature on the existence of a Pareto-eﬃcient pension reform, I realize
that there exists a lot of articles reporting the possibility of Pareto-improving pension reform,
as well as many of them state that such a reform is impossible. After closer consideration,
3I ﬁnd that the answer to this question depends on the type of reformed economy and the
set of policy instruments which used during the reform3. This motivates me to write the
present section, which concludes that a Pareto-improving pension reform is impossible for
only two types of economy: an open economy with inelastic labor supply; and open economy
with pension system where beneﬁts are proportional to contributions (without lump-sum
component). This allows me to conclude that Pareto-improving transitions from pay-as-
you-go to fully funded pension systems nearly always exist.
2.1 Background
The early literature considers a pay-as-you-go system with a lump-sum form of pension
beneﬁts. Thus, Breyer (1989) proved the impossibility of an eﬃcient debt-ﬁnanced transition
for both closed and open economies, using a simple two-period overlapping generations model
(OLG2) and assuming the constancy of labor supply. Then, Homburg (1990) showed that a
Pareto-improving transition is possible for an open economy with endogenous labor supply.
Finally, Breyer and Straub (1995) proved the existence of a Pareto-eﬃcient transition for a
closed economy, where labor is endogenously chosen. Although the authors documented the
possibility of an eﬃcient transition, they did not provide a policy mechanism.
Later, researchers have investigated diﬀerent policies to ﬁnd out whether their implemen-
tations allow for intergenerational-eﬃcient pension reforms. The ﬁrst bulk of papers considers
diﬀerent debt-tax policies for reforming a lump-sum beneﬁt pension system. Raﬀelhuschen
(1993) provides an eﬃcient policy, which uses both a public debt issue and lump-sum taxes
and transfers for compensating transition generations. Kotlikoﬀ (1995) also provides the
simulations of Pareto-improved transitions using a lump-sum redistributive authority mech-
anism for the compensation of transition generations. Brunner (1994, 1996) rejected the use
of lump-sum taxes for compensating losers as hardly being implemented in an economy with
3Orszag and Stiglitz (2001) (p. 24), for example, characterize the transition cost as unavoidable. ”If
the economy is dynamically eﬃcient, one cannot improve the welfare of later generations without making
intervening generations worse oﬀ.” To support this point, the authors provide Breyer’s (1989) argument for
an open economy with exogenous labor supply, ignoring, however, the entire later literature.
4heterogeneity inside one generation. However, Hirte and Weber (1997) simulates an eﬃcient
transition without using lump-sum taxes. They provide a transition implemented by debt
issue to compensate for the ﬁrst years of reform, and then consumption or income taxes for
debt and interest repayments. Demmel and Keuschnigg (1999) proved the feasibility of a
debt-ﬁnanced Pareto-improving transition from a system with a lump-sum form of beneﬁts,
where the government gradually reduces payroll taxes.
The next group of papers investigated the feasibility of a Pareto-improving pension re-
form, when beneﬁts are proportional to contributions. Fenge (1995) opened the discussion.
He proved the Pareto-eﬃciency of a pay-as-you-go system in an open economy with elastic
labor supply, where beneﬁts are proportional to contributions. In other words, he demon-
strated that a Pareto-improving transition could not be implemented by changing payroll
tax rates and the implicit return of contribution rates, combined with debt-ﬁnancing. Wrede
(1998) extended this result for a three-period model, doubting the simulation results pro-
vided by Hirte and Weber (1997), where the authors simulated a Pareto-eﬃcient transition
for both extreme cases of linkage between beneﬁts and contributions. However, Hirte and
Weber’s results do not contradict Fenge’s ﬁndings, since they investigate a closed economy.
They also compared two transition paths starting from steady states, distinguished by the
degree of beneﬁts to compensations linkage, and found that transition from the lump-sum
scheme can more easily be implemented. Kotlikoﬀ (1995) conﬁr m st h i sr e s u l t .
Valdes-Prieto (1997) provides a Pareto-improving transition, implemented by a gradual
decrease in the rate on pension contributions and a simultaneous reduction in the use of
payroll tax rate. This policy allows the government to carry out an eﬃcient pension reform
in an open economy with constant labor supply and stochastic income4, which is impossible
for the same type of economy with deterministic incomes.
Belan, Michel and Pestieau (1998) introduced a saving subsidy form of pension beneﬁts, in
addition to generally considered lump-sum beneﬁts and proportional to contribution forms.
Assuming a constant labor supply and lump-sum beneﬁts in an initial steady state, the
4This article considers deterministic income only. For more information about stochastic income and
Social Security see De Nardi, Imrohoroglu and Sargent (1999) and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (1999).
5authors showed that switching to saving subsidies improves the welfare of both current and
future generations, which allows a pension reform to be implemented in one period for a
closed economy. (See also Wigger (1998)).
Finally, Feldstein (1996) proposes the policy mechanism, which is the perfect opposite
to debt-ﬁnanced strategy. In particular, he suggested increasing the payroll tax rate and
investing additional revenue, which would allow the government to accumulate the necessary
for a transition fund. Although such a policy does not in itself allow the implementation
of a Pareto-improving transition itself, it is an excellent addition to the policy schemes,
which do not use debt but generate an additional welfare gain for the ﬁrst generation in a
transition, for example when a government increases the degree of linkage between beneﬁts
and contributions. I will refer to such a policy as ”prefunding”.
2.2 Classiﬁcation.
Summarizing the results on the existence of a Pareto-improving pension reform, I classify
the literature by four characteristics of reformed economies and transition policies. In other
words, the existence of a Pareto-eﬃcient pension reform depends on the answers to the
following questions:
1) Is the economy closed or open?
2) Is labor supply elastic or constant?
3) What is the form of the pension beneﬁts: lump-sum or proportional to the contribu-
tion?
4) Which policy mechanisms are implemented during the transition?
Table 1 summarizes the existing literature according to my classiﬁcation.
6Table 1.
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According to this classiﬁcation, there are only two types of economy-pension system
which can not be reformed on a Pareto-improving way. namely they are ”open economy with
constant labor supply” and ”open economy when beneﬁts are proportional to contributions”.
Both systems present the extreme cases, which can not be observed in practice.
2.2.1 Open vs. closed economy.
Pay-as-you-go systems are less destructive in open economies, but a closed economy can
more easily be reformed.
The diﬀerences between open and closed economies are important for investigating a
pension system for the following reasons. First, in the case of a closed economy, savings
equal investments and, therefore, contribute as an important intergenerational pecuniary
externality. In an open economy, a pay-as-you-go system can simply be considered as tax on
5The result is ”yes” if the corresponding paper proves the existence of or provides a simulation of a
Pareto-improving pension reform. The result is ”No” if the paper proves the impossibility of implementing
a Pareto-improving reform of the corresponding pay-as-you-go system in a corresponding economy by using
the corresponding transition policy.
7pension contributions, where the tax rate equals the diﬀerence between the interest rate and
the wage fund growth. (See Valders-Prieto, 1997). Those taxes are thrown away without
being used for ﬁnancing government expenditures. In a closed economy, a pay-as-you-go
system does not only create this wasteful tax on pension contributions, but also reduces the
capital stock.
Closed economies can more easily be reformed. Pareto-improving transitions exist for
closed economies regardless of the elastic i t yo fl a b o ro rt h ef o r mo fp e n s i o nb e n e ﬁts. Thus, if
labor supply is independent of pay-roll tax rate, a Pareto-improving transition from a pay-
as-you-go system with lump-sum beneﬁts exists in a closed economy and can be implemented
by saving subsidizing (Belan, Michel and Pestieau (1998)). This is impossible in an open
economy, however (Breyer (1989)). Moreover, a debt-ﬁnancing Pareto-improving transition
from a pay-as-you-go system with proportional beneﬁts is possible for a closed economy but
impossible for an open one, as proved by Fenge (1995). The reform implementation is easy
in a close economy because a capital provision, made by the old, has an impact on the
wage rate earned by the young which, in turn, causes the changes in payroll tax revenue.
Also, government borrowing has more complicated consequences in a closed economy. For
example, it does not only increase government liabilities, but also enlargers the interest rate,
thereby causing the growth of savings and increase in welfare of lending generations.
Summarizing, I would like to emphasize that the terms ”closed” and ”small open” rep-
resent two extreme theoretical structures. Everything in the world is located somewhere in
between, containing some degree of ”closeness”. In other words, national savings are more
or less important for national investment as well as for the wage and interest rates in any
country. And if an economy is not perfectly ”small open” it is possible to implement a
Pareto-improving reform.
2.2.2 The elasticity of labor supply.
Once a pay-as-you-go system is ﬁnanced by labor income taxes, the elasticity of labor supply
is important for both the existence and the duration of a Pareto-improving reform. Although
a pay as you go pension system creates less harm for the economy with constant labor supply,
8a Pareto-improving transition can be implemented the easier the large the response of labor
supply to the value of pension beneﬁts. Indeed, a pay-as-you-go system ﬁnanced by payroll
taxes in a deterministic open economy with exogenous labor supply is eﬃcient, as shown by
Breyer (1989).
But undersupply of labor is not the most important source of the ineﬃciency in a closed
economy: the bad pecuniary intergenerational externalities created by insuﬃcient savings
seem to be more important. However, the degree of elasticity of labor supply plays an
essential role in the choice of transition policy. Thus, closed economy with constant labor
should be reformed by substituting lump-sum pension beneﬁts with saving subsidies (Belan,
Michel and Pestieau ,1998). This is impossible for an economy with a large elasticity of
labor supply and lump-sum beneﬁts, and such an economy should be eﬃciently reformed by
increasing the degree of linkage between beneﬁts and contributions.
2.2.3 The degree of linkage between beneﬁts and contributions.
The third dimension of my classiﬁcation is related to the form of the initial pension system.
If beneﬁts are proportional to contributions, the negative impact of pay-as-you-go systems
on labor supply is much lower than in the case of lump-sum pensions. For example, labor
supply does not depend on the contribution rate in an economy with logarithmic preferences
when beneﬁts are proportional to contributions. However, pension systems with a lower
linkage between beneﬁts and contributions can more easily be reformed. Thus, for the open
economy, Fenge (1995) showed that an eﬃcient transition is impossible if the beneﬁts are
proportional to the contributions, while its feasibility for the lump-sum form of beneﬁts was
proved by Homburg (1990). In the real world, almost all pension systems have a lump-sum
component, which allows a Pareto-improving reform even in a perfectly open economy.
2.2.4 The choice of transition policy.
The existence and speed of a Pareto-improving pension reform do not only depend on the
initial structure of the economy, but also on the instruments used by a government during
a transition. The existing literature considers several instruments: switching to another tax
9base, debt issue, an increase in the degree of linkage between beneﬁts and contributions, the
introduction of a saving subsidy. Below, I discuss all these measures in more detail .
T h ec h o i c eo ft a xb a s e . According to Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987), consumption tax
is less destructive than income one, capital income or wage income taxes, and Kotlikoﬀ
(1996) repeats this result. The authors do not set Pareto-eﬃciency as a goal in either of
these papers. To deﬁne the consumption tax rate, they use a revenue-neutral condition.
However, for the welfare-neutral tax, the government should increase the tax rate up to the
amount that allows compensating the old for having paid their consumption taxes. Such
a large rate has too large a destructive eﬀect on the economy and, therefore, switching to
consumption tax in the ﬁrst period does not help ﬁnd additional ﬁnancial sources for an
eﬃcient transition. Nevertheless, it can be used in later stages to reach a better steady
state in an economy where a government must ﬁnance expenditures non-related to social
securities. In other words, the implementation of a pension reform provides the ﬁnancing of
a global Pareto-improving tax reform, when a more distorting income tax can be replaced
by a less distorting consumption tax. It also allows the repayment of part of the government
debt and reduces interest expenditure which, in turn, leads to a further reduction in the tax
burden.
Increasing linkage between beneﬁts and contributions. Increasing the degree of
linkage between beneﬁts and contributions has been widely proposed as an improvement of
pension systems. This measure causes a signiﬁcant improvement even in the ﬁrst period
of reform for two reasons. First, the growth of labor supply will exceed capital growth,
thereby shifting the interest rate upward, which would make the lending generation better
oﬀ. Second, although the growth in labor supply reduces wages, the total payroll is growing,
which allows the government to collect additional revenue without changing the tax rate.
Maintaining pension on the promised level, the government can invest additional revenue
in order to generate means for further reform. This investment will also create a favorable
pecuniary externality, providing the economy with a larger capital stock. My simulations
10show that an eﬃcient transition can be implemented by a pure increasing linkage between
beneﬁts and contributions if a government has the option to reduce promised pensions while
maintaining utility levels. Otherwise, if the government must commit on pension promises,
the pure policy of increasing in linkage between beneﬁts and contribution may not allow a
Pareto-improving transition. However a combination with prefunding makes such a reform
feasible.
Saving subsidy in a closed economy. The policy of a saving subsidy seems to be the
most eﬃcient in a closed economy, since the main source of ineﬃciency in the current pay-as-
you-go systems is a capital underaccumulation due to low returns on pension contributions.
The saving subsidy form of pension beneﬁts has been proposed relatively recently by Belan,
Michel and Pestieau (1998). In a closed economy, a saving subsidy increases capital accumu-
lation and signiﬁcantly improves the welfare of working generations. A larger capital stock
increases the wages of the next generation, which allows a reduction in the payroll tax rate
without loss in tax revenue. Moreover, pensions paid in the form of saving subsidies create
lower distortions for the labor market than lump-sum pensions, which will be show later in
the example of logarithmic preference6. Belan, Michel and Pestieau (1998) show that the
government can make the eﬃcient reform of an economy with constant labor supply in one
period by using savings subsidies instead of lump-sum pensions. I ﬁnd that savings subsidies
are not suﬃcient in themselves for an economy with endogenous labor supply, if the gov-
ernment has obligations in term of the size of pensions. Nevertheless, a savings subsidy in
combination with government prefunding makes it possible to complete a Pareto-improving
reform when labor is elastic to the tax rate. This is also possible for savings subsidies if
government obligations are expressed in terms of welfare. A savings subsidy can improve the
debt ﬁnancing strategy for the reform of pension systems characterized by a proportional
relation between beneﬁts and contributions.
6See formula (12) p. 27
11Government prefunding There is another transition policyw h i c hIw i l lc a l lg o v e r n m e n t
prefunding7. This policy is the exact opposite of debt-ﬁnancing and is realized via additional
government savings, allowing the generation of a suﬃcient budget surplus to ﬁnance a reform.
This policy can only be Pareto-improving in combination with another policy, which does
not include the running of additional debt and allows the generation of additional revenue in
the ﬁrst period of transition. An example of such policies is the increase in the share of the
pension in proportion to contributions and savings subsidies. Those transition methods can
be signiﬁcantly improved by prefunding. To complete the prefunding policy in isolation, the
government must raise a payroll tax or reduce expenditures, thereby breaking the Pareto-
improving constraint.8.
3 Heterogeneity is not an obstacle in implementing a
Pareto-improving transition
The main goal of this section is to convince the readers that heterogeneity inside one genera-
tion is not an obstacle to completing an eﬃcient pension reform. The ﬁrst time heterogeneity
w a sp r o v i d e da sa na r g u m e n ta g a i n s tape n s i o nreform for an open economy in Brunner (1994)
and for a closed one in Brunner (1996). In particular, the author introduced two types of
householders with identical preferences but diﬀerent productivity levels and concluded that if
there is a great diﬀerence in earning abilities, the Pareto-improving transition is impossible.
The main reason is that to maintain the same level of utility as in the initial steady state,
7Although the authors propose to place the means in the Individual Retirement Accounts, these savings
are mandatory, and the householders have no access to their accounts before their retirement, when accumu-
lated resources become withdrawable according to the design of the government pension plan. In the simple
framework of my model, this operation is equivalent to a government investment.
8In earlier papers (1995, 1996, 1997), Feldstein and Samwick propose an increase in a payroll tax rate,
leaving pension obligations unchanged, while later on (1999, 2000), they propose to use the exogenous
gain generated by the US economy. (See also Martin Feldstein ”Don’t Waste the Budget Surplus”, The
Wall Street Journal, November 4, 1997. http://www.nber.org/feldstein/wj110797.html) This source is not
generally available.
12the government might have to use diﬀerent tax-transfer rates for diﬀerent individuals. In the
case of imperfect information, it might be diﬃcult to deﬁne what tax rate must be associated
with a particular agent. An incorrect tax level, in turn, might make one householder worse
oﬀ. I will refer to this argument as a ”coordination problem”. Subsection 3.1 disputes this
by providing Pareto-improving transitions in the economy with two agents distinguished by
productivity levels or preference parameters. In those transitions, the government only uses
ﬂat payroll taxes to compensate transition generations.
Brunner (1994, 1996) correctly rejected lump-sum taxation as a policy instrument, but
his main ﬁnding was based on incorrect assumptions. For example, Brunner (1996) assumed
the impossibility of a Pareto-improving debt-ﬁnanced transition for a closed economy. This
assumption was theoretically refuted by Demmel and Keuschnigg (1999) by demonstrating
that a transition to a funded system might be made welfare improving for all generations
through a proper use of public debt and proportional payroll taxes to compensate any poten-
tial losers. Before that, Hirte and Weber (1997) simulated Pareto-improving debt-ﬁnanced
transition without using lump-sum tax. Despite the incorrectness of some assumptions,
Brunner’s argument is very important and must be carefully investigated. The importance
of the argument of intra-cohort diversity is supported by resent research attention. Thus,
Kotlikoﬀ (1996) uses a Smetters and Walliser modiﬁcation of the Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ Dy-
namic Life-Cycle Model, which incorporates twelve householder groups distinguished by
productivity level. Discount rate heterogeneity is considered by Samwick (1998), where the
author proposes a transition tax/beneﬁt menu, investigating the dependence of a chosen
option on a householder’s time discount rate. Those papers do not pretend to achieve a
Pareto-eﬃciency, however.
Brunner’s argument is very often referred to as an obstacle in the implementation of a
pension reform. This is not correct and must be rejected. Even if Brunner’s argument is
true for an economy with very big inequality, we still have to clarify, how big it should
be. The existance is proven for homogeneous economy when income tax used during the
transitio. Therefore, it may happen, that a Pareto -improving pension reform exists for all
reasonable calibration. I provide transition simulations for economies where earning abilities
13or preference parameters are very diﬀerent.
The second argument against pension reforms in a heterogeneous economy relates to the
redistributive or the insurance function of a pay-as-you-go system. The simple abolishment
of social security in this case can lead to the welfare loss of poor householders or general
worthiness in case of very risky income and in the absence of another insurance mechanism.
These arguments were provided by Fenge and Schwager (1995) and have been used by other
researchers. Thus, Conesa and Krueger (1999) ﬁnd ”that the role of a pay as you go social
security system as a partial insurance and redistributive devise signiﬁcantly reduces political
support for a transition to an economy with a fully funded system”. Storesletten, Telmer
and Yaron (1998) attach importance to the risk-sharing aspect of social security and the
fundamental trade-oﬀ of distortion versus risk sharing.
I ﬁnd these arguments to be weak since redistributive or insurance mechanisms can be
supported without running ineﬃcient pay-as-you-go systems, which I propose to replace by
taxes and transfers within one generation. This policy allows the government to maintain
its redistributive or insurance function, while it helps us get rid of the ineﬃciencies related
to indirect taxing of the pension contribution. Subsection 3.2 discusses this in more detail.
3.1 Diﬀerences in productivity or preferences still allow the Pareto-
improving pension reform to be complete by using homoge-
neous tax rates.
In the present section, I will disprove the ”coordination” argument by providing numerical
simulations for economies with householders distinguished not only by productivity level but
also by preferences. For this purpose, I will consider a closed economy with endogenous labor
supply, where an initial pay-as-you-go system has a lump-sum pension beneﬁt, but diﬀerent
groups of individuals receive diﬀerent pensions proportional to the payroll tax payed by the
total group. By using this construction, I avoid redistribution inside one generation, but cap-
ture all distortions related to low linkage between beneﬁts and contributions. Such a pension
system appears when the government pays a beneﬁt that is not proportional to individual
14contribution, but dependent on the contributions made by the part of society with the same
occupation, professional qualiﬁcation, regional location, union or other memberships. The el-
ements of such pension systems were present in the Former Soviet Union where beneﬁts were
independent of individual eﬀorts, but diﬀered across regions and occupations. According to
Edvards (1996), the pre-reform Chilean system had the same characteristics. Considering
such a pension system allows me to separate the eﬀects related to the coordination problem
of a pension reform from the ones related to redistribution.
To simplify the presentation I provide technical framwork in appandix 5.
3.1.1 The role of diﬀerences in productivity
In this subsection, I argue that at least for the logarithmic utility function, the diﬀerence in
productivity levels is not important since the economy might be replaced by an equivalent
representative consumer model, providing the same outcome of capital and labor supply as
well as the welfare dynamics. Then, I discuss simulation results for the additive constant
relative risk-averse (CRRA) preferences.





























As already mentioned, I will consider an economy with a zero intergenerational redis-
tributive eﬀect. In my economy, householders pay a proportional labor income tax, and
receive diﬀerent lump-sum beneﬁts, proportional to the contribution of the total group with
the same productivity. Therefore, pensions are proportional to productivity levels and, as a
result, both householders work the same number of hours and consume proportionally to the
productivity level or to eﬃcient labor supply. Formally, if (c,l) is the solution to the problem
15for parameter ai =1 ,t h e n( aic,l) will be the solution to the general problem. Moreover,











which is true for all periods, t. This means that the transition policy has the same impact
on individuals’ welfare dynamics. Since eﬃcient labor supply and savings are proportional
to productivity levels, the problem is equivalent to that of a representative agent with a






where qi is a proportion of individuals with productivity ai.
Therefore, if preferences are logarithmic, the introduction of diﬀerent productivity levels
does not principally change the model, even if the diﬀerences are very large.
The diﬀerence in productivity is important for other preferences, but nevertheless, a
Pareto-eﬃcient debt-ﬁnanced transition exists. I consider an eﬃcient transition for the












(1 − lt)1−1/ρ − 1
1 − 1/ρ
(6)
where ρ > 0 is a parameter determining how responsive individual labor supply is to changes
i nt h ew a g er a t e .I fρ > 1, a householder works more when wages increase, while if ρ < 1, a
growing wage causes increasing leisure. Logarithmic preference is a special case when ρ =1 ,
and the choice of labor supply does not depend on the wage.
T a b l e s2a n d3p r o v i d ee ﬃcient transition paths for ρ =1 .67 and 0.5, respectively.
16Table 2.
Diﬀerent Productivity Levels and CRRA Preference (ρ > 1)
Parameters
alpha beta theta prod1 prod2 rho
0.3 0.7 0.3 1 0.01 1.67
t debt tax rate welf 1 welf 2 s1 s2 L1 L2 r w Cy 1 Cy 2 Co 1 Co 2
ss 0 30.00% 0.0% 0.0% 0.042 0.0000 0.403 0.030 1.472 0.354 0.058 4.4E-05 0.146 0.0001
-1 0 30.00% 0.0% 0.0% 0.042 0.0000 0.403 0.030 1.472 0.354 0.058 4.4E-05 0.146 0.0001
0 0 29.99% 0.0% 0.0% 0.042 0.0000 0.403 0.030 1.472 0.354 0.058 4.4E-05 0.146 0.0001
1 0.000091 29.77% 0.1% 0.1% 0.042 0.0000 0.405 0.031 1.475 0.354 0.058 4.4E-05 0.146 0.0001
2 0.00061 28.90% 0.2% 0.3% 0.044 0.0000 0.409 0.031 1.477 0.354 0.059 4.5E-05 0.148 0.0001
3 0.00138 26.94% 0.5% 0.8% 0.047 0.0000 0.419 0.032 1.474 0.354 0.061 4.7E-05 0.150 0.0001
4 0.002075 23.00% 1.0% 1.6% 0.054 0.0000 0.436 0.035 1.453 0.356 0.065 5.2E-05 0.153 0.0001
5 0.00057 16.56% 2.2% 3.1% 0.067 0.0001 0.463 0.038 1.380 0.364 0.074 6.1E-05 0.154 0.0001
6 0 3.76% 18.1% 20.0% 0.086 0.0001 0.493 0.043 1.223 0.383 0.096 8.4E-05 0.175 0.0002
7 0 0.00% 29.9% 32.7% 0.097 0.0001 0.507 0.046 1.043 0.410 0.112 1.0E-04 0.190 0.0002
8 0 0.00% 33.9% 37.1% 0.100 0.0001 0.512 0.046 0.964 0.424 0.117 1.1E-04 0.195 0.0002
9 0 0.00% 35.2% 38.5% 0.102 0.0001 0.514 0.047 0.940 0.429 0.119 1.1E-04 0.196 0.0002
10 0 0.00% 35.7% 39.0% 0.102 0.0001 0.514 0.047 0.933 0.430 0.119 1.1E-04 0.197 0.0002
new ss 0 0.00% 35.9% 39.2% 0.102 0.0001 0.514 0.047 0.930 0.431 0.119 1.1E-04 0.197 0.0002
Increasing in a New Steady State  146% 197% 28% 54% -37% 22% 105% 147% 36% 64%
Table 2 is consistent with Kotlikoﬀ’s (1995) paper, where the author states that the
welfare gains for the poorer income group exceed those of the richer group. Moreover, a low-
productive class starts to beneﬁt earlier than high-productive ones. This occurs as soon as
the net tax wage reaches an initial level, which must be reduced in the ﬁrst periods of debt-
ﬁnanced transition, following the reduction in capital. A decreasing wage is compensated by
payroll tax reductions; these two factors together create a positive impact on the growth of
labor supply. These results held for all ρ > 1.
Table 3 presents an eﬃcient transition for a small ρ =0 .5. As expected, employment is
lower in a new steady state but households beneﬁt from a higher capital stock and wages.
The gain from a transition is larger for the more productive group.
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Diﬀerent Productivity Levels and CRRA Preference (ρ = 0.5)
Parameters
alpha beta theta prod1 prod2 rho
0.3 0.7 0.3 1 0.01 0.5
t debt tax rate welfare1 welfare2 s1 s2 L1 L2 r w Cy 1 Cy 2 Co 1 Co 2
ss 0 30.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.031 0.000 0.747 0.967 2.760 0.270 0.110 1.4E-03 0.179 2.3E-03
-1 0 30.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.031 0.000 0.747 0.967 2.760 0.270 0.110 1.4E-03 0.179 2.3E-03
0 0.00017 29.93% 0.00% 0.00% 0.031 0.000 0.747 0.967 2.760 0.270 0.110 1.4E-03 0.178 2.3E-03
1 0.00096 29.39% 0.01% 0.00% 0.032 0.000 0.748 0.967 2.774 0.270 0.110 1.4E-03 0.179 2.3E-03
2 0.00253 28.73% 0.02% 0.00% 0.034 0.000 0.749 0.968 2.763 0.270 0.110 1.4E-03 0.179 2.3E-03
3 0.00435 27.80% 0.03% 0.00% 0.036 0.000 0.750 0.968 2.763 0.270 0.110 1.4E-03 0.179 2.3E-03
4 0.00675 26.47% 0.06% 0.02% 0.039 0.000 0.752 0.968 2.758 0.271 0.111 1.4E-03 0.179 2.3E-03
5 0.00836 25.23% 0.10% 0.05% 0.041 0.001 0.753 0.968 2.736 0.271 0.111 1.4E-03 0.178 2.3E-03
6 0.00788 23.99% 0.83% 0.78% 0.044 0.001 0.753 0.968 2.668 0.274 0.113 1.5E-03 0.177 2.3E-03
7 0.00395 22.11% 0.47% 0.42% 0.050 0.001 0.754 0.968 2.510 0.282 0.115 1.5E-03 0.169 2.2E-03
8 0 11.84% 12.52% 12.52% 0.069 0.001 0.746 0.967 2.092 0.305 0.132 1.7E-03 0.176 2.3E-03
9 0 0.00% 39.68% 39.25% 0.089 0.001 0.725 0.964 1.561 0.345 0.161 2.1E-03 0.204 2.7E-03
10 0 0.00% 50.05% 49.23% 0.097 0.001 0.719 0.962 1.293 0.374 0.172 2.3E-03 0.215 2.9E-03
new ss 0 0.00% 55.14% 54.08% 0.099 0.001 0.715 0.962 1.186 0.388 0.177 2.4E-03 0.219 3.0E-03
Growth 216% 228% -4.3% -0.6% -57% 44% 61% 67% 23% 28%
3.1.2 Diﬀerence in preferences should not be considered a barrier to a pension
reform
Motivated by Brunner’s idea on heterogeneity in each generation, I investigate an econ-
omy with two types of individuals distinguished by preferences. Simulating numerically an
economy where two householders have diﬀerent time discount and leisure to consumption
preferences, I ﬁnd that Pareto-improving debt-ﬁnanced transitions exist. In my experi-
ment, I set diﬀerent β (β1 =0 .7; β2 =0 .5), diﬀerent γ (γ1 =2 .5; γ2 = 5) and diﬀerent ρ
(ρ1 =0 .7,ρ2 =1 .11). The results are presented in tables 4, 5 and 6, respectively.
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Diﬀerent Preferences for Leisure Relative to Consumption
Parameters
alpha beta gamma1 gamma2 theta
0.3 0.7 2.5 5 0.3
t debt tax rate welfare1 welfare2 s1 s2 L1 L2 r w Cy 1 Cy 2 Co 1 Co 2
ss 0 0.00% 0.0% 0.0% 0.03 0.02 0.372 0.228 1.887 0.3183 0.056 0.034 0.113 0.069
-1 0 30.00% 0.0% 0.0% 0.03 0.02 0.372 0.228 1.887 0.3183 0.056 0.034 0.113 0.070
0 0.00006 29.94% 0.0% 0.0% 0.03 0.02 0.372 0.229 1.888 0.3182 0.056 0.034 0.113 0.070
1 0.00035 29.67% 0.0% 0.0% 0.03 0.02 0.373 0.229 1.888 0.3182 0.056 0.034 0.113 0.070
2 0.00045 29.30% 0.1% 0.1% 0.03 0.02 0.374 0.230 1.884 0.3185 0.056 0.035 0.113 0.070
3 0.00025 28.37% 0.1% 0.1% 0.03 0.02 0.377 0.232 1.873 0.3193 0.057 0.035 0.113 0.070
4 0 25.08% 0.1% 0.2% 0.03 0.02 0.385 0.239 1.839 0.3218 0.059 0.037 0.113 0.070
5 0 15.99% 0.8% 0.9% 0.05 0.03 0.405 0.254 1.719 0.3313 0.066 0.042 0.110 0.069
6 0 0.00% 26.7% 26.9% 0.06 0.04 0.405 0.254 1.367 0.3655 0.087 0.055 0.130 0.081
7 0 0.00% 35.8% 36.0% 0.07 0.04 0.405 0.254 1.129 0.397 0.094 0.059 0.137 0.086
8 0 0.00% 38.7% 38.9% 0.07 0.04 0.405 0.254 1.067 0.406 0.097 0.061 0.139 0.087
9 0 0.00% 39.6% 39.8% 0.07 0.04 0.405 0.254 1.049 0.409 0.097 0.061 0.139 0.087
10 0 0.00% 39.8% 40.0% 0.07 0.04 0.405 0.254 1.043 0.410 0.098 0.061 0.140 0.088
new ss 0 0.00% 39.9% 40.1% 0.07 0.04 0.405 0.254 1.041 0.411 0.098 0.061 0.140 0.088
Increasing in a New Steady State  155% 160% 9% 11% -45% 29% 75% 78% 23% 26%
Table 4 presents an eﬃcient transition path for an economy with two individuals distin-
guished by the parameter of the preference for leisure to consumption. A welfare analysis
shows that the householder with a larger preference for leisure starts to enjoy a pension
reform earlier and his gain in a new steady state is larger.
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Diﬀerent Time Discount Rates
Parameters
alpha beta1 beta2 gamma theta
0.3 0.8 0.5 2.5 0.3
t debt tax rate welfare1 welfare2 s1 s2 L1 L2 r w Cy 1 Cy 2 Co 1 Co 2
ss 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.0306 0.0178 0.387 0.344 2.005 0.3101 0.053 0.057 0.128 0.086
-1 0 30.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.0306 0.0178 0.387 0.344 2.005 0.3101 0.053 0.057 0.128 0.086
0 0 29.89% 0.05% 0.06% 0.0307 0.0179 0.387 0.344 2.005 0.3101 0.053 0.057 0.128 0.086
1 0.00019 29.74% 0.18% 0.20% 0.0309 0.0180 0.387 0.345 2.002 0.3103 0.053 0.057 0.128 0.086
2 0.000384 29.64% 0.22% 0.25% 0.0311 0.0182 0.387 0.345 1.999 0.3105 0.054 0.057 0.128 0.086
3 0.000526 29.51% 0.20% 0.24% 0.0313 0.0183 0.388 0.346 1.998 0.3106 0.054 0.057 0.128 0.086
4 0.000725 29.06% 0.18% 0.27% 0.0319 0.0189 0.389 0.347 1.996 0.3107 0.054 0.058 0.129 0.086
5 0.001085 27.65% 0.21% 0.50% 0.0338 0.0204 0.393 0.350 1.983 0.3116 0.055 0.059 0.128 0.086
6 0.001805 23.67% 0.82% 1.71% 0.0391 0.0247 0.402 0.359 1.933 0.3150 0.058 0.062 0.128 0.086
7 0 16.14% 0.79% 3.21% 0.0508 0.0341 0.419 0.375 1.788 0.3257 0.064 0.068 0.124 0.083
8 0 0.00% 25.97% 30.55% 0.0666 0.0448 0.419 0.375 1.433 0.3581 0.083 0.090 0.146 0.098
9 0 0.00% 34.79% 40.16% 0.0723 0.0485 0.419 0.375 1.186 0.3884 0.090 0.097 0.153 0.103
10 0 0.00% 37.56% 43.19% 0.0740 0.0497 0.419 0.375 1.120 0.3980 0.093 0.099 0.156 0.105
new ss 0 0.00% 38.77% 44.51% 0.0748 0.0503 0.419 0.375 1.093 0.4021 0.094 0.101 0.157 0.105
Increasing in a New Steady State  144% 182% 8% 9% -45% 30% 76% 77% 22% 23%
Table 5 provides a simulation result for an economy where householders have diﬀerent
time discount rates. At the beginning of a transition, when interest rates should necessarily
increase due to government borrowing, an individual with a smaller time discount rate will
have a somewhat larger welfare gain, while later, when the interest rate falls to a lower level
as compared to that in an initial steady state, a householder representing the other type will




alpha beta theta rho 1 rho 2
0.3 0.7 0.3 0.70 1.11
t debt tax rate welfare1 welfare2 s1 s2 L1 L2 r w Cy 1 Cy 2 Co 1 Co 2
ss 0 30.00% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0397 0.0431 0.6830 0.5652 2.0044 0.3102 0.109 0.080 0.183 0.182 
-1 0 30.00% 0.00% 0.0% 0.0397 0.0431 0.6830 0.5652 2.0044 0.3102 0.109 0.080 0.183 0.182 
0 0.000086 29.96% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0397 0.0431 0.6830 0.5653 2.0059 0.3101 0.109 0.080 0.183 0.182 
1 0.000959 29.69% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0403 0.0436 0.6836 0.5663 2.0074 0.3100 0.109 0.080 0.183 0.182 
2 0.002120 29.32% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0412 0.0444 0.6844 0.5677 2.0052 0.3101 0.109 0.080 0.183 0.183 
3 0.003190 28.74% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0425 0.0455 0.6855 0.5697 2.0003 0.3104 0.109 0.080 0.183 0.182 
4 0.003520 27.70% 0.1% 0.9% 0.0448 0.0475 0.6872 0.5727 1.9828 0.3116 0.110 0.082 0.182 0.181 
5 0.001820 25.37% 0.6% 2.2% 0.0501 0.0518 0.6902 0.5787 1.9306 0.3152 0.112 0.084 0.180 0.178 
6 0.000000 18.63% 1.1% 4.5% 0.0669 0.0657 0.6999 0.5967 1.8031 0.3246 0.118 0.092 0.174 0.169 
7 0.000000 3.09% 23.1% 28.5% 0.0900 0.0879 0.6898 0.6063 1.4792 0.3533 0.146 0.120 0.198 0.194 
80 0 . 0 0 % 36.4% 42.5% 0.1013 0.0993 0.6832 0.6089 1.2023 0.3861 0.162 0.136 0.213 0.209 
90 0 . 0 0 % 40.7% 47.1% 0.1050 0.1030 0.6812 0.6097 1.1044 0.4004 0.168 0.141 0.218 0.214 
10 0 0.00% 42.0% 48.5% 0.1062 0.1042 0.6806 0.6100 1.0764 0.4049 0.169 0.143 0.220 0.215 
new ss 0 0.00% 42.60% 49.09% 0.1065 0.1045 0.6803 0.6101 1.0646 0.4068 0.170 0.144  0.220 0.216 
Increasing in a New Steady State  168% 143% -0.4% 7.9% -47% 31% 57% 80% 20% 19%
Table 6 provides an eﬃcient debt ﬁnanced transition for an economy with two types of
householders, distinguished by the concavity of the preference function. At the beginning
of the transition, when the after tax wage is lower as compared to an initial steady state, a
government should take more care about a householder whose labor supply is more elastic
with respect to wage, which means that ρ is larger. At this stage, representatives for the
other type are better oﬀ, while later on, when the net of tax wage grows, the individual with
larger ρ gains more.
3.2 Redistributive and insurance role of a pay-as-you-go system
When linkages between contributions and beneﬁts are low, a pay-as-you-go system receives
additional functions of redistributive and insurance mechanisms. Therefore, the simple abol-
ishment of social security in this case can lead to a welfare loss for poor householders. This
argument against pension reform is provided by Fenge and Schwager (1995), where the
authors pay attention to the redistributive eﬀect of a pay-as-you-go system across one gen-
eration. Similar arguments were used by other researchers until recently. Nevertheless, a
Pareto-improvement is possible if a pay-as-you-go system is replaced by other mechanisms
21maintaining a suﬃcient level of redistribution. Such replacement would maintain the util-
ity welfare level of the poor and insure agents against an idiosyncratic productivity shock.
However, an ineﬃcient tax on pension contributions related to interest rate dominance over
population growth would be eliminated. The best policy would be to tax the oldest and pay
transfers to the youngest. In this way, the government would exploit the diﬀerence between
t h ep o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hr a t ea n dt h er a t eo nc a p ital returns. If such a policy is not feasible
for political reasons, the government can still achieve a welfare progress for everybody by
intragenerational redistribution; i.e. a transition to an economy with a progressive wage
income tax or a proportional payroll tax and lump-sum transfers within one generation.
4 Concluding summery
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Pareto-improving transitions from pay-
as-you-go to fully funded pension systems nearly always exist. Based on the review of
existent literature as well as my own simulations, I ﬁnd that such a transition is possible
for all reasonable assumptions on reformed economies. I also discuss some details related
to the execution of such transitions. In particular, the policy used in transition should
be chosen depending on the economic characteristics of the initial pension system. Thus,
for the closed economy saving subsidizing is more eﬃcient when labor supply is exogenous,
while a strengthening of the linkage between beneﬁts and contributions is preferable when
the coeﬃcient of elasticity between leisure and consumption is large. The answer to the
existence question depends drastically on the policy instruments chosen by the government.
My second ﬁnding is that intragenerational heterogeneity in productivity or preferences
does not prevent the execution of a Pareto-improving transition to a fully funded system
with redistribution within one generation.
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5 Appendix : Technical framework
I conduct my research by experimenting with listed transition methods and applying them
to diﬀerent types of economies. For this purpose, I use a two period overlapping generations
model.
Formula (7) describes a householder’s saving decision made under budget constraint (8).
max
cy,co,l
Ut =l n ( cyt)+β ln(cot+1)+γ ln(1 − lt); (7)
st. : cyt(1 + tct)+
cot+1 (1 + tct+1)
(1 + rt+1 + Φt+1)
=( 8 )
= wtlt(1 − taxt)+
Ωt+1(1 − taxt)wtlt + Pent+1
1+rt+1 + Φt+1
.
Here, cyt,c ot constitute the consumption of young and old households in period t, respec-
tively, and lt is labor. Terms r and w represent the interest rate and the wage. β and γ are
test parameters; in particular, β is a time discount factor, while γ indicates the intensity of
household preferences for leisure relative to consumption. I consider a combination of three
types of pension beneﬁt forms: lump-sum, proportional to contributions, and proportional
to savings; using the following notation:
Pen t+1− a lump-sum pension beneﬁt;
26Ωt+1− the coeﬃcient of return on after tax labor income;9
Φt+1− a savings subsidy rate.
Notations taxt and tct represent payroll and consumption tax rates, which the government
can set up to ﬁnance its expenditures.
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Considering a closed economy, I assume that the production function has a Cobb-






Proﬁt maximization by representative ﬁr m si nt h ee c o n o m ya n dc o m p e t i t i v e n e s si m p l y
the following expressions for wage and capital price:













1−tax,w h e r eΩ0
t+1is the coeﬃcient of returns to contribution, which should be equal to
GDP growth in steady state in a zero debt economy, or to 1 according to my simple speciﬁcation. I choose
this notation for simplicity.
27where kt+1 is capital per worker in the next period.
For simplicity, I assume that the only government function is to support a pension sys-
tem. Then capital per worker is deﬁned as current workers’ savings st minus government
debt in formula (17) in the assumption of zero population growth. The government debt
should be excluded from aggregate investment because it is used to ﬁnance the government
expenditures which do not include investment in my simple framework.
kt+1 = st − debtt, (17)
where debtt+1 equals government debt.
In an open economy, the wage and the interest rate are constant.
The government has the next budget constraint:
debtt + Tt = Pt +( 1+rt)debtt−1, (18)
Tt = taxtwtlt + tct (cot + cyt), (19)
Pt = Pent + lt−1wt−1(1 − taxt−1)Ωt + Φtst, (20)
where Tt and Pt represent total tax revenues and total pension payments to the old, respec-
tively. Equations (7)- (20) provide a complete description of the simulated model.
In this framework, the government sets policy parameters (Pen t, Ωt, Φt,t a x t,t c t,d e b t t)i n
any time period t satisfying budget constraint (18). The Pareto-improving condition implies
that for any time period t,
Ut > Uss, (21)
where Ut is a lifetime utility of the individual born at period t, while Uss is the utility
level of the individual living in an initial steady state. This puts additional restrictions on
government policy.
I use a variation of the solution method described in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987).
Following these authors, I make the calculation in three stages: (1) solving for the initial
steady state, (2) solving for the ﬁnal steady state, (3) choosing the parameterization and
solving for the transition. In stage (3), I choose policy parameters so that restriction (21)
28is satisﬁed. I made my simulations assuming that in period 100, the economy has already
converged to new steady states. This is more than enough; for comparison, the Auerbach
and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) simulation model provides the economy with 150 years to reach a new
steady state in a ﬁfty-ﬁve period OLG model.
For the welfare analysis, I use a wealth equivalent deﬁned as the proportion by which a
householder living in an initial steady state needs to increase his consumption in every period,
in order to reach the life-time utility value of currently young households. Expression (22)
formalizes the deﬁnition
U (cyt,c ot+1,l t)=U (cyss ∗ (1 + welt),c oss ∗ (1 + welt),l ss). (22)
For logarithmic preferences, a welfare measure welt is calculated by formula (23)






where Uss is equal to the householder’s utility in the initial steady state.
5.0.1 Technical modiﬁcations for the simulation of a heterogeneous model with
diﬀerent pension funds but lump-sum beneﬁts.
Here, I list the additional formulas needed to simulate a two-agent model.









Here, ai is the productivity level of an individual from group i =1 ,2; qi is a proportion
of the corresponding group; while li
t is the working time of the representative of group i. In
other words, li
















































The formula deﬁned output, the wage per eﬃcient unit, the interest rate and the capital














Further, I assume that society splits equally between two groups of individuals, or that
qi =1 /2.
A complete sensitive analysis has been done for all simulations provided in this section.
5.1 Transition from pay-as-you-go to ”redistribution among young”


















In a simulated economy, payroll taxes are used for three purposes. The government
pays pensions to the old, transfers to the young and execute debt service. I assume that
the government sets payroll taxes at the rate tpent and issues new debt for expenditures
related to the pension system and debt running, while ttt is the share of payroll only used
for transfers to the young.






(debtt + Pen Taxest − (1 + rt)debtt−1), (29)
















where n is a number of diﬀerent income groups.
The equations for saving should also be modiﬁed
s
i
t = wta(1 − (tpent + ttt))l
i
t + transfer
i
t − c
i
yt.
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